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ABSTRACT
In a 1974 paper in the Journal of Political Economy I discussed the
theoretical ambiguity of the effect of social security on private saving
and presented statistical evidence that social security does on balance
depress saving. Recently, an error was detected in the computer program
that was used to construct the "social security wealth" variable. I have
now corrected that error and reestimated the original consumer expenditure
equation. I have also updated the analysis by including the five years of
additional data that have become available since the original study was
completed. The new estimates, presented in the current note, continue to
indicate that social security substantially depresses private saving. The
point estimates of this effect are somewhat lower than before but nevertheless
imply that social security depresses saving by about fifty percent of its
current value. The estimated reduction in saving is more than two—thirds
of the concurrent "contributions" of employees and employers to the social
security retirement and survivors fund.
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"The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated."
Cablefrom Mark Twain to
theAssociatedPress, 1897.
In a l974 paper in the Journal of Political Economy (Feldstein,
l91), I discussed the theoretical ambiguity of the effect of social security on
private saving and presented statistical evidence that social security does on
balance depress saving. Recently, an error was detected in the computer program
that was usedto construct the "social security wealth"variable.1 I havenow
correctedthat error and reestimatedthe original consumer expenditure equation.
Ihave also updated the analysis by including the five years of additional data
that have become available since the original study was completed. The new
estimates, presented in the current note, continue to indicate that social
security substantially depresses private saving. The point estimates of this
effect are somewhat lower than before but nevertheless imply that social security
depresses saving by about fifty percent of its current value. The estimated
reduction in saving is more than two—thirds of the concurrent "contributions" of
employees and employers to the social security retirement and survivors fund.
*HarvardUniversity and the National Bureau of Economic Research. I am grate-
ful toDavid Reitman for help with this research andto the NBER and the
NationalScience Foundation for financial support. This paper is part of the
NBER study of Capital Formation.
1 The error wasdiscoveredby Dean Leimer and Selig Lesnoy andisdiscussed in
Leimerand Lesnoy (1980).—2—
1. Social Security Wealth
Social security reduces private saving because individuals substitute
the social security benefits that they expect to receive for the private wealth
that they would otherwise accumulate —directlyas well as through private pen-
sions and life insurance —tofinance their consumption after they are retired.
However the social security program not only replaces ordinary saving as a means
of financing retirement consumption but also induces earlier retirement and
therefore increases the amount of retirement consumption to be financed.1 1he
net impact of social security on saving depends on the balance between the
wealth replacement effect and the induced retirement effect and can therefore
only be determined empirically.
The principal difficulty in any econometric study of the effect of
social security on private saving is measuring the level of benefits that indi-
viduals expect to receive in the future. The actual benefits are revised
periodically by Congress and, until 1972, were subject to the uncertainties of
inflation. Moreover, individuals differ in their understanding of the social
security program and in their confidence or optimism about Congress' willingness
to maintain or increase future real benefit levels. In ur 19714 paper, I used
the actuarial present value of the future benefits to which the current working—
1 This idea isdeveloped more fully in Feldstein (1974) andshownformally in
Feldstein (1977). Additional aspects of ambiguity are discussed by Barro (1978)
and Feldstein and Pellechio (1979).—3—
age population was entitled, a variable that I called "social security
wealth. "i
The constructed annual time series of this "social security wealth"
for the years since the inception of the social security program reflected every
change in coverage and in the rules used to compute the benefits of retirees and
dependents. Each annual value of social security wealth also reflected the
demographic structure of the population, the employment pattern, and the age—sex
specific mortality rates. The calculation assumed that Congress would maintain
a constant ratio of benefits to average earnings and that real earnings would
grow at 2 percent a year for the indefinite future.
This complicated actuarial calculation of social security wealth was
both too complex and not complex enough. It was too complex to be a realistic
description of the way that individuals actually think about future benefits.
It is an overly precise way of estimating the intuitive judgements about the
levels of benefits on which individuals make decisions about saving and
retirement.2And at the same time, the algorithm used to calculate social
Social security wealth is, of course, not a perfect substitute for ordinary
wealth for several reasons: social security wealth is in the form of an
annuity; it cannot be used as collateral for a loan; its value depends on future
Congressional action; etc. These issues are discussed in Feldstein arid
Pellechio (1979) and Feldstein (1979b).
2 ocourse, to the extent that these decisions are part of the process of pri-
vate pension planning, the complex actuarial evaluation may be a reasonable
approximation._1
security wealth wasnotcomplex enough because it did not take into account such
things as the variation of individual wages around the general growthtrend, the
remarriage of surviving spouses, the presence of dependent children, etc.
Although a more precise variable could have been defined, such extraprecision
would not necessarily correspond to a more realisticapproximation of individual
expectations 1
The social security wealth variable defined in thisway was added to a
conventional consumer expenditure ftnction of the type that hadpreviously been
estimated by Ando and Modigliani (1963). The estimatedcoefficient of the
social security wealth variable was 0.021 (with a standarderror of 0.006),
implyingthat each dollar of social security wealth reducedpersonal saving by
approximately 2.1 cents.
Irecently discovered that an error was made by theprogrammer who
converted the specification of social security wealth intoFortran. The error
occurs in the section of the program that incorporates the 1951change in the
benefits paid to surviving spouses. Because theprogram failed to reset
the initial value in a "do loop" operation eachyear, the calculated value
of social security grew faster thatthecorrect specification implied. It is
worth stressing that this was a pure programmingerror and did not reflect a
1
The initial specification of social security wealth inmy 19714 paper andin subsequentanalysis was not the result of a search procedure. I definedone set
of assumptions before any regressions were estimatedand they have remained
unchanged. Alternative discount rates were tried but this variationdid not
alter the estimated effect of social securityon aggregate saving.—5—
misunderstandingof the law or a xnisspecification of social security wealth.
Section 2 of the present paper examines the implications of correcting
the error and reestimating the original equation. Updates of the sample period
to 197)4 and 1916 are also presented. A final section comments on some extension
of the basic specification and on the relation of the time series estimate to
other evidence.
2. Reestimating the Basic Specification
The basic specification in my 197)4 paper relates consumer expenditure
to disposable income (YD), lagged disposable income (YD_1), corporate retained
earnings (RE), the value of wealth at the end of the previous year (w_1), social
security wealth (ssw), and a constant term. All variables are real per capita
values and the equation was estimated with annual data from 1929 through 1971
with 19)41 —)46 excluded.1 The estimated coefficients of that equation arerepro-
duced as equation 1.1 of Table 1.2 Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
The key social security wealth variable has a coefficient of 0.021. The other
coefficients are a plausible size and all are significantly different from zero.
The sum of squared residuals and Durbin—Watson statistic are presented in the
1 Since the official national income account dataare only available since 1929,
the value for 1929 corresponds to the one year lag of YD_1. All other variables
begin in 1930.
2 To facilitatecomparison with the other equations in this paper, the original
variables in equation 1.1 are rescaled by 1000; this changes only the constant
term and the sum of squared residuals.—6—
Table 1
Consumption Functions with Social Security Wealth
Eq.ual Period SSW SSW W_1 YD YD_1 RE Const. SSR
Variable DWS
1.1 1929—71 Old 0.021o.0i40.5300.120 0.3560.2280.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.047) (o.o35)(o.o74) (0.031) 1.82
1.2 1929—71 Old 0.0240.0050.5950.123 0.2090.3510.012
(0.009) (0.005) (0.061) (o.o42)(o.o86) (0.078) i.4o
1.3 1929—71 Program 0.0150.0110.6480.109 0.1180.2360.014
Corrected (o.oio) (0.005) (0.058) (O.O45)(o.o89) (0.055) 1.23
1.4 1929—74 Old 0.0250.0040.6060.112 0.1830.3550.014
(0.009) (0.005) (o.o6i) (o.o4o)(o.o) (0.080) 1.55
1.5 1929—74 Program 0.0110.0090.6860.100 0.0660.1980.017
Corrected (0.010) (0.006) (0.057) (0.O4lt)(.8) (0.055) 1.40
i.6 1929—74Revised0.0170.0110.6450.103 0.1320.2470.015
(0.008) (o.oos) (0.057) (o.O41)(o.072) (0.050) 1.31
1.7 1929—76 Program 0.0020.0070.7430.094 0.0240.1390.024
Corrected (o.oii) (0.006) (0.062) (0.O52)(o.088) (0.060) 1.37
1.8 1929—76Revised0.0180.0090.6710.090 0.0670.2400.022
(0.009) (0.006) (0.065) (o.ol.i8)(o.o7) (0.058) 1.29—7—
final column; since all of the equations reported in thispaper have i2 values
of nre than 0.99, this statistic is not reported.
After the original research was completed, the Department of Commerce
released its major revision of the national income accounts. This changed all
of the annual data for consumer expenditure and for income. An even nre
substantial revision of the retained earnings variable was made by using econo-
mic depreciation instead of historic cost tax depreciation. Equation 1.2pre-
sents the estimates based on these new data but retaining the original social
security wealth variable. These changes cause the coefficient of the social
security wealth variable to rise slightly (from 0.021 to 0.02I) and its standard
error to increase (from 0.006 to 0.009).
Correcting the computer programming error and reestimating with the
new national income and wealth data yields equation 1.3. The coefficient of the
social security wealth variable is reduced to 0.015 with a standard error of
0.0095. The corresponding t—statistic implies that the probability of observing
such a large value if the true value were not positive is less than 0.08. The
point estimate of 0.015 and the 1971 value of social security wealth1 of $i,66)i
billion imply that social security reduced 1971 personal savingby$25 billion.
1 Social security wealth, like all of the othervariables, is measured in 1972
dollars. The 1971 value of SSW is $1,73 billion; using the consumer expen-
diture deflator implies that the corresponding value in 1971 dollars is $1,664
billion.—8—
By comparison, the actual 1971 value of personal saving was $57 billion and
total private saving was $74 billion. The implied reduction in saving is thus
44 percent of personal saving and 34 percent of private saving. In short,
correcting the programming error (as well as accepting the Department of
Commerce's corrections in the national income data) reduces the coefficient of
social security wealth from the original published value but implies an effect
that is both statistically significant and economically very large.
In a short note published after my 1974 paper (Feldstein, l979a), I
used the updated national income data and extended the old social security
wealth calculation for an additional three years to 1974. Those results, pre-
sented in equation i.4, were generally consistent with my earlier estimates,
indicating in fact a slightly larger social security wealth coefficient (0.025
with a standard error of 0.009). Dean Leimer and Selig Lesnoy (1980) used the
corrected social security wealth variable through 1974 and reestimated this
equation. They found a much smaller regression coefficient that was barely
larger than its standard error and concluded that the evidence is consistent
with the hypothesis that social security does not depress saving. Equation 1.5
presents the equation with the corrected SSW for the period until 1974. Two
things should be noted. First, even if the low coefficient of 0.011 were
correct, it would still imply a quite substantial effect on saving. Since the
corrected 1974 value of SSW was $2,342 billion, the implied reduction in
saving wouldbe$26 billion; by comparison, private saving was $72 billion.
Second, the standard error implies that the probability of observing such a—9—
coefficient if the true coefficient were not positive is less than 0.15;
whilethis is greater than the usual level of significance, it still represents
substantial odds that there is a positive effect of social security wealth on
consumpt ion.
There is however good reason to be skeptical about the estimate in
equation 1.5. Beginningin 1912, there wasa major change in social security
benefits.Thelevel of benefits was raised 20 percent and benefits were indexed
to rise automatically with the price level. This increase in benefits implies a
corresponding increase in social security wealth that is not reflected in the
"corrected" social security wealth variable. Making this change for the years
1972 through 197I (as well as correcting the programming error) produces the
coefficientsin equation 1.6. Taking this major legislative change into account
makes the results through 197k similar to the results through 1971 (before the
legislativechange) that were presented in equation 1.3. The coefficient of SSW
rises slightly to 0.017; the addition of three years' data no longer produces a
large and otherwise unexplained reduction. The standard error of 0.0066 implies
a t—statistic of 2.3, indicating that the effect of social security wealth is
statistically significant at any conventional level. A comparison of the sum of
squared residuals in equations 1.5 and 1.6 shows that taking the legislative
revision into account significantly improves the explanatory power of the nde1.
Extending the analysis to 1916 confirms the importance of taking the
legislativerevision into account.1 Equation 1.7 is based on the corrected
1 At present, 1976 is the most recentyear for which all ofthe social security
information that is needed to construct SSW is available.—10—
series while equation 1.8 uses the revised series that differs for the five year
interval beginning in 1972. With the revised series, the parameter estimates
are quite similar to the values for the samples ending in 1971 and 197)4. By
contrast, when the 1eislative change is ignored, the addition of two extra
years causes the social security wealth coefficient to drop virtually to zero.
The sum of squared residuals also indicates that the revised series explains the
variation substantially better than the series that ignores the legislative
change.
The best estimate of the effect of social security wealth, based on
evidence for all of the available years, is therefore approximately 0.017. The
variations in the coefficient from sample to sample and the standard error of
0.008 indicate that it would be inappropriate to give too much weight to the
precise value of this coefficient. It is nevertheless interesting to consider
the implication of this parameter value. In 1976, the value of social security
wealth (in 1976 dollars) was $3,238 billion. The coefficient of 0.017 implies
that social security reduced personal saving in 1976 by $55 billion. For
comparison, in 1976 personal saving was $69 billion and total private saving was
$95 billion. The implied reduction of $55 billion is thus 58 percent of the
actual total private saving and 37 percent of the potential total private saving
of $150 billion (the sum of $55 billion and $95 billion). Since the 1976 GNP
was $1,702 billion, the implied reduction in saving is equivalent to 3.2 percent
of GNP; by comparison, total private saving in the 1970's averaged 5.9 percent
of GNPFinally, it is interesting to compare the reduction in saving to the—11—
$63 billion in taxes that employers and employees paid in 1916 in social
security taxes for the Old Age and Survivors Insurance program; each dollar of
contribution corresponds to an 87 cent reduction in private saving.
To conclude this section, it is useful to note how rapidly social
security wealth has grown since the inception of the program. Table 2 shows the
ratio of real social security wealth to GNP since 194O. In 19b0, social
security wealth was 77 percent of GNP. This ratio has grown continually,
reaching 100 percent in 1950 and nearly 200 percent in 1975.1
A complete listing of the new social security wealth series is presented in
the appendix.—12—
Table 2
The Relation of Social Security Wealth to GNP
Year SSW GNP SSW/GNP
(Billions of 1912 dollars)
19140 263 3143 0.77
1950 49O 5314 0.92
1960 946 737 1.28
1965 1288 926 1.39
1970 1679 1075 1.56
1975 2319 1202 1.93—13—
3. Futher Evidence
In addition to the basic equation, I have alsoestimated a more
general specification that tries to separate the wealthreplacement effect from
the induced retirement effect by explicitlyincluding the current labor force
participation rate of men aged 65 and older as an additional variable.1In the
context of the extended life cycle model ofmy 1971t paper, this variable should
have a positive coefficient (reflecting the factthat a lower planned retirement
rate means that less saving is needed to finance retirementconsumption) and its
presence should increase the coefficient of social security wealth (whichthen
reflects only the wealth replacement effect). That infact does happen with the
new data and with all three sample periods.
In an alternative specification, I have also allowedchanges in the
unemployment rate to alter the marginal propensity to consume. Thecoefficient
of the additional variable varies in size and statisticalsignificance,
depending on the full specification and time period. With thesample ending in
1971, the coefficient of the unemployment variable is less thanits standard
error. With the full sample (through 1916) the unemployment variableis posi-
tive and statistically significant and itspresence reduces the coefficient of
the social security wealth variable to 0.012 if the laborforce participation of
older men is excluded and to 0.015 if that variable is included.
In the original 197L paper, I also tried to estimate theeffect of
social security wealth in a much smaller sample restricted to thepostwar
1 This is the specificationused with time—series data in Munnell (1978) and
with cross—country data in Feldstein (1979)._11_
period.There is much less variation in all the variables in this truncated
sampleand therefore much more difficulty in estimating any of the coefficients
precisely. The coefficient of the social security wealth variable was somewhat
lower (0.O14instead of0.021) but its standard error was also so much larger
(0.030instead of 0.006) thatno inference could be made with anyconfidence.
Withthe corrected social security wealth series, the postwar estimates, like
the earlier results, show a positive but insignificant coefficient of social
security wealth, 0.009 with a standard error of 0.013.1
In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing that the difficulties of
measuring expected social security benefits and of separating the effect of
social security from the effects of other variables that influence saving will
always leave a substantial margin of uncertainty aboutthe precise magnitude of
socialsecurity's effects. But the new time—series estimates, like the old
ones, are all consistent with njotherresearch based on large samples of indi-
vidual household data and on cross—country evidence.2 All of these studies sup-
port the conclusion that the level of social security benefits has a major
influence on individual saving behavior.
October 1980
1Failure to reflect the 1972 legislative change hastheanomalous effect of
making the coefficient of social wealth negative.
2See Feldstein (1976, 1980b) and Feldstein and Pellechio (1979)for studies
basedon individual household data andFeldstein(1977, 1980a) for cross—country




Revised Series in Billions of 1972 Dollars
1937 160.400 1957 882.000
1938 l43.500 1958 880.900
1939 236.300 1959 929.600
19)40 262.900 1960 946.400
19)41 343.800 1961 973.600
1942 432.600 1962 1,052.000
19143 459.300 1963 1,093.800
1944 46.6oo 1964 1,188.300
19)45 450.400 1965 1,287.700
1946 465.400 1966 1,393.100
1947 443.500 1967 1,470.500
19148 )464.ioo 1968 1,545.900
1949 442.100 1969 1,609.400
1950 489.700 1970 1,679.200
1951 6oi.ioo 1971 1,734.200
1952 629.500 1972 2,209.800
1953 662.700 1973 2,422.680
1954 656.300 1974 2,404.560
1955 758.000 1975 2,318.760
1956 81)4.700 1976 2,438.280References
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